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with the unrecorded federal tax claim. Although Speers to a limited
extent represents an erosion in favor of state and local governments
of the effectiveness of the unrecorded federal tax lien, its effect upon
distributions to general creditors of the bankrupt is nonexistent. Of
course, the Government can avoid the whole Speers problem entirely
by recording its lien before bankruptcy in accordance with § 6323
of the Internal Revenue Code. If the Government should, as a matter
of policy, decide that the effect of Speers upon the federal revenue
is great enough to warrant recordation in all cases, then the result
of Speers will be simply the elimination of the secret aspects of the
federal tax lien.
JOSEPH D. LOGAN, I1
TAXATION-LEGAL FEES IN UNSUCCESSFUL CRIMINAL
DEFENSE HELD DEDUCTIBLE AS BUSINESS EXPENSES
In Commissioner v. Tellierl the Supreme Court was presented with
the argument that legal fees incurred in the unsuccessful defense of
a criminal charge arising out of taxpayer's business, though they meet
the literal requirements of § 162(a), are not deductible because de-
duction would reward criminal activity. Taxpayer in Tellier was
engaged in the business of underwriting and selling securities. He
was convicted and fined $18,000 for violating the fraud section of
the Securities Act of 1933,2 the mail fraud statute,3 and conspiracy
to violate both of these statutes.4 In his defense taxpayer incurred
and paid approximately $23,000 in legal fees, and he sought
to deduct this expenditure as an "ordinary and necessary" business
expense under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Com-
missioner disallowed the deduction and was sustained by the Tax
Court on the ground that "public policy" bars the deduction of legal
expenses incurred in defense of acts found to be criminal.0 The 2d
Circuit en banc unanimously reversed 7 and the Supreme Court agreed,
holding that such expenses are "ordinary and necessary" within the
'86 Sup. Ct. 1118 (1966).
248 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1954).
81g U.S.C. S 1341 (1948).
418 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
5Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a), "There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business .....
0Walter F. Tellier, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1207 (1963).
7Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
CASE COMMENTS
meaning of § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, hence fully de-
ductible because no sharply defined public policy is frustrated by
allowing the deduction.8"
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a deduction for "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses" incurred in carrying on a trade or
business.9 Judicial interpretation of the statutory language "ordinary
and necessary" requires only that the expenditure be directly con-
nected with or proximately result from the taxpayer's business,' 0
that the expenditure be common and accepted in that type of busi-
ness,11 and that the expenditure be appropriate at the time or helpful
to the taxpayer.12 In short "ordinary" has been construed to mean
"normal" or "common" among similarly situated businessmen, and
"necessary" has been construed to mean "helpful" or "appropriate"
to the maintenance of the taxpayer's business.13 Cardozo in applying
the statutory language to legal fees said:
Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments must be
habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have
to make them often. A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business
may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy
that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense is an ordinary
one because we know from experience that payments for such a
purpose, whether the amount is large or small, are the common
and accepted means of defense against attack.14
Although the Code imposes no general requirement that business
expenses be lawful or arise out of lawful activities,' 5 the judiciary
has developed a "public policy" exception to the Code language deny-
ing the deduction of otherwise "ordinary and necessary" expenses if
886 Sup. Ct. 1118 (1966).
OInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162 (a).
10 E.g., Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928).
"E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93 (1952); Commissioner v.
Heiniuger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943); Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).
12E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 93-94; Commissioner v. Heinin-
ger, supra note 11, at 471.
13 See, e.g., Lilly v. United States, 348 U.S. 90 (1952); Deputy v. duPont, 308
U.S. 488 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933); Kornhauser
v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928). Commissioner v. Tellier, supra note 1, at
1120 provides:
The principal function of the term ordinary in § 162(a) is to clarify the
distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently de-
ductible and those that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which, if'
deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the asset.
' 4Welch v. Helvering, supra note 13, at 114.
'5 Commissioner v. Heininger, supra note 11, at 474; 50 Cong,-Rec. 3849 (1913).
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such expenditures arise out of or are related to unlawful activities.10
Of course some expenditures, particularly those illegal or unethical
in themselves, may validly be disallowed as extraordinary if they are
uncommon or unaccepted ways of doing business.' 7 The underlying
reason for disallowing expenditures associated with illegal activity is
that the allowance of a deduction will, through the consequent reduc-
tion of tax liability, benefit, hence encourage, illegal activities."8
Although such reasoning has merit, it fails to recognize that a basic
goal of the federal tax system is conformation of tax liability solely
to the ability to pay.19 To accomplish this the tax should be measured
by net, rather than gross income. No matter how large the gross
from business activities may be, if there is no net income, there is, at
least theoretically, no greater ability to pay than there would have
been if the activities had not been engaged in.20 The denial of other-
wise "ordinary and necessary" business expense deductions results in
measuring tax liability in terms of gross income, contrary to a basic
principle of our tax system.
21
The judiciary early formulated rules as to the tax deductibility of
litigation expenses. No deduction is allowed for legal expenses if they
are incurred in purely personal litigation.22 However, legal expenses
incurred in maintaining or defending a civil action arising out of the
16See, e.g., United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1961);
Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d 439
(5th Cir. 1963); N. A. Woodworth Co. v. Kavanaugh, 202 F.2d 154 (6th Cir.
1953).
17See, e.g., United Draperies. Inc. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.
1964), where it was held: "the record reveals nothing inherent in the nature of
petitioner's drapery enterprise which serves to endow such payments with a
character of ordinariness they would not otherwise possess. In reaching this con-
clusion we do so apart from consideration of the morality or legality of the
practice" Id. at 938, but compare the dissent which felt that the "kickback"
payments were ordinary and necessary within the meaning of the applicable
regulations. The dissenting justice stated: "the methods used by the taxpayer
in the instant case should be prohibited," but that this result should be
attained by Congressional action and not by court edict. id. at 938. See also
Reid, Dissallowance of Tax Deductions on Grounds of Public Policy-A Critique,
17 Fed. BJ. 575, 582-83 (1957).
'8E.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).




22 ee United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963), where the Court held
that "the origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was
incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer,
is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal'
within the meaning of § 162 (a). -
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conduct of business have uniformly been held deductible.2 Moreover,
taxpayers have uniformly been allowed to deduct legal fees incurred
in the successful defense of a criminal action where the acts arose
out of the conduct of their business. Successful defenses include ac-
quittal,24 dismissal,25 nolle prosequi, 2 and favorable consent decrees.
27
Until Tellier the lower courts had uniformly disallowed the deduction
of legal fees incurred in the unsuccessful defense of criminal actions
where the acts arose out of the conduct of business.28
This disallowance was first established in Burroughs Bldg. Material
Co. v. Commissioner9 in 1932 by the same Circuit that later abrogated
it. Taxpayer had claimed deductions for fines imposed and legal fees
incurred in a criminal prosecution for antitrust violations. Burroughs
disallowed the deduction of the fines and legal fees, reasoning that
public policy requires that "illegal" acts not be sanctioned by the
courts, and concluded: "If the fines and costs cannot be deducted,
the legal expenses . . . should naturally fall with the fines them-
selves." 3 0 The court overlooked an important distinction between
fines and legal fees in arriving at its conclusion, as have courts fol-
lowing this precedent. The amount of a fine, in theory, represents
an appropriate exaction for unlawful conduct. Although disallow-
ing deduction of a fine may be necessary to sustain its punitive effect,31
litigation expenses are, in theory, of no concern to the criminal law.
Their disallowance creates an additional penalty not called for by
the statutory violation. Further, the amount of legal expenses varies
with the time spent in conducting the defense rather than with the
severity of the crime; thus the denial of the deduction may be unduly
harsh in relation to the statutory penalty.
3 2
The application of a broad "public policy" rationale in disallowing
business deductions was considerably restricted in 1943 by the Supreme
23See, e.g., Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1935); John W. Clark,
30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
24Commissioner v. People's-Pittsburg Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1932).
25Commissioner v. Shapiro, 278 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960).
26Morgan S. Kaufman, 12 T.C. 1114 (1949).
27National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d
Cir. 1937).
28See, e.g., Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963); Acker v.
Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v.
Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931); Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801
(1947).
2947 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1931).
3ld. at 180.
3lCf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
32 See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 752, 757 (1951).
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Court in Commissioner v. Heininger.33 The Court held that a business
expense deduction may be disallowed only when permitting the de-
duction would "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies
proscribing particular types of conduct." U Lilly v. Commissioner5
added a further restriction when it allowed business expense deduc-
tions for kickback payments by opticians to doctors for glasses pre-
scribed by the doctors because there was no clear frustration of a
public policy "evidenced by some governmental declaration." The
Court suggested such. declarations should be left to "the province of
legislatures." 36 Finally, the "test of nondeductibility always is the
severity and the immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance
of the deduction." 37
The Supreme Court has found "frustration of sharply defined pol-
icy" in only 2 types of otherwise "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses: (1) criminal fines,8 8 (disallowed in order not to frus-
trate legislative policy by reducing the 'sting' of the prescribed pen-
alty); (2) lobbying expenditures, 89 (disallowed on the ground that
expenses incurred in influencing legislation or securing government
contracts should not receive governmental sanction in any form). 40
Moreover, the Supreme Court has continually emphasized that the
intent of Congress in providing for deduction of ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses was, except where specifically provided other-
wise,41 to tax net income regardless of its source, rather than to
"reform men's moral characters." 42 Thus, in 1958 the Court in
Commissioner v. Sullivan48 held payments for rent and employees'
salaries in the conduct of an illegal gambling enterprise were deduct-
83320 U.S. 467 (1943).
841d. at 473.
85343 U.S. 90 (1952).
S61d. at 97.
87Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
88Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
S9Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
4oSee Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1408 (1954). These holdings are now embodied
in § 162(e) (2) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954. § 162(e) (2) states that the
§ 162 deduction is disallowed "For any amount paid or incurred ... in con-
nection with any attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof,
with respect to legislative matters, elections, or referendums."
41E.g., nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(d) which limits the deduction of wagering
losses to the amount of wagering gains.
4250 Cong. Rec. 3849 (1913) (cited in Tellier supra note 8, at 1121); Commis-
sioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467, 474 (1943).
48356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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ible, even though the payments violated the applicable state penal
statute. Sullivan reasoned that amounts paid as wages and rent are
"ordinary and necessary expenses" in the accepted meaning of those
words and that to disallow them "would come close to making this
type of business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts, while all
other business would be taxable on the basis of net income. If that
choice is to be made, Congress should do it." 44 As a result of Sullivan,
the Justice Department recommended to Congress a bill disallowing
expenses incurred by businesses violating state and federal statutes. 4
The proposal was never enacted. A few years earlier Congress had
considered a bill disallowing expenses resulting from illegal gambling
and rejected it on the ground that the Internal Revenue Code is not
intended to penalize or prohibit unlawful activities.46
These recent rejections by Congress coupled with the Supreme
Court decisions in Heininger and Lilly seem to endorse neutrality
in the administration of the tax statutes where illegal conduct is in-
voked as a basis for disallowing business deductions. In any case the
frustration doctrine announced in Heininger requires only that al-
lowance of a deduction not frustrate sharply defined public policy,
that is, more than frustration of vague or general policy is required.
The attitude with which the pre-Tellier lower courts have ap-
proached the issue presented in Tellier is illustrated by Learned Hand's
statement that to allow deduction of counsel fees for an unsuccessful
defense would tend to "subsidize the obduracy of those offenders
who were unwilling to pay without a contest and who therefore
added impenitence to their offense." 47 Such reasoning is especially
inappropriate when applied to vague statutes regulating trade prac-
tices, in which neither the Government nor the defendant can in any
real sense be said to know the requirements of the law before the
courts declare it.4s As a result of Hand's language and of dictum in
Heininger,49 it has been suggested that the deduction be allowed only
where the criminal defense is asserted in good faith.50 This suggestion
441d. at 29.
45H.R. Rep. No. 7394, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
4697 Cong. Rec. 12230-44 (1951).
47jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949).
48See Comment, 72 Yale LJ. 108, 135 (1962).
40320 U.S. 467, 471. "Since the record contains no suggestion that the defense
was in bad faith or that the attorney's fees were unreasonable, the expenses in-
curred in defending the business can also be assumed appropriate and helpful,
and therefore 'necessary.'"
60McDonald, Deduction of Attorney's Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes,
103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 168, 180 (1954).
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has been criticized for the administrative difficulties it presents, since
a test based on the good faith of the defense would seem to place an
impossible burden on the courts, the Internal Revenue Service, and
the taxpayer.51 Moreover, it is difficult to know what, short of a
defense that itself violates the law, is a bad faith defense. Perhaps
Hand's contention has merit where the crime is malum in se. In
making no reference to either the nature of the crime for which the
taxpayer was convicted, or the merits of the defense presented, the
Supreme Court apparently rejected by implication both of these
distinctions. But the Commissioner, who has long espoused the view
rejected in Tellier, will in all probability continue to use such dis-
tinctions to disallow these deductions.
52
The 2d Circuit in holding contrary to long established precedent
remarked:
There has been no 'governmental declaration' of any 'sharply de-
fined' national or state policy of discouraging the hiring of coun-
sel and the incurring of other legal expense in defense against a
criminal charge. In fact it is highly doubtful whether such a pub-
lic policy could exist in the face of the Sixth Amendment's
guaranty of the right to counsel.Ps
Both the 2d Circuit's and the Supreme Court's reasoning are related
to decisions defining the defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
The Court stated that no public policy is offended when one faced
with serious criminal charge employs a lawyer to help in his defense.
To the contrary, "in an adversary system of criminal justice, it is
a basic of our public policy that a defendant in a criminal case have
counsel to represent him." 54 But the reasoning in Tellier may not be
sound. Late in its opinion the Court assumed the issue to be whether
there is a public policy to deter the employment of counsel. Surely
no such policy exists. The real issue is whether there is a public
policy against deducting litigation expenses incurred in unsuccessfully
defending a criminal charge. The Court merges these 2 issues by
presupposing that a denial of the deduction would deter the employ-
5t Comment, 72 Yale LJ. 108, 134 (1962).
52"During the oral arguments before the Court, the question arose as to
whether a person engaged in bank robbing as a trade or business could deduct
his legal fees in fighting prosecution. A liberal reading of the Court's opinion
could lead to a 'yes' answer. Under the rationale of Sullivan, it is apparent that
the business itself does not have to be legal. However, it remains to be seen if
Tellier can be stretched that far." 24 J. Taxation 300 (May 1966).
53Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965).
54Commissioner v. Tellier, supra note 1, at 1122.
